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A model of Boolean game with only one free parameter p that denotes the strength of herd behavior
is proposed where each agent acts according to the information obtained from his neighbors in
network and those in the minority are rewarded. The simulation results indicate that the dynamic of
system is sensitive to network topology, where the network of larger degree variance, i.e. the system
of greater information heterogeneity, leads to less system profit. The system can self-organize to a
stable state and perform better than random choice game, although only the local information is
available to the agents. In addition, in heterogeneity networks, the agents with more information
gain more than those with less information for a wide extent of herd strength p.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le,05.65.+b,87.23.Ge,89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
Complex adaptive systems composed of agents under
mutual influence have attracted considerable interest in
recent years. It is not unexpected that the systems with
globally shared information can be organized. A ba-
sic question in studies of complexity is how large sys-
tems with only local information available to the agents
may become complex through a self-organized dynamical
process[1].
The mutual influence can be properly described as the
so-called information network, in which the nodes repre-
sent agents and the directed edge from x to y means the
agent y can obtain information from x. For simplicity,
the undirected networks are considered in this paper. In
this way, node degree k is proportional to the quantity
of information available to the corresponding agent. The
two extensively studied information networks of ecosys-
tem are regular[2, 3, 4] and random[1, 5] networks, both
of which have a characterized degree-the mean degree 〈k〉:
for regular networks, all the node are of degree 〈k〉; and
for random ones, the degree distribution decays quickly
in a Possionian form when k > 〈k〉. The existence of
characterized degree means every node has almost the
same capacity of information. However, previous empir-
ical studies have revealed that the information networks
may be of scale-free property[6, 7, 8], in which the giant
heterogeneity of information exists. The nodes of larger
degree predominate much more information than those
of less degree thus the information heterogeneity can be
measured by the degree variance 〈k2〉. The question is
how the topology affects the system dynamic, will the
∗Electronic address: bhwang@ustc.edu.cn
greater information heterogeneity induce more profit for
the system, or contraryly?
Another question being concerned of in this paper is
about the herd behavior, which has been extensively
studied in Behavioral Finance and is usually consid-
ered as one factor of the origins of complexity that
may enhance the fluctuation and reduce the system
profit[9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. Here we argue that, to mea-
sure the strength of herd behavior, it is more proper to
look at how far the agents’ actions are determined by
others rather than how far the agents want to be in ma-
jority, since in many real-life cases, the agents would like
to be in minority but the herd behavior still occurs. We
wonder whether agents have different responses under a
fixed herd strength, and whether the variation trends of
system profit and individual profit are the same as the
increase of herd strength.
In this paper, a model of Boolean game with only one
free parameter p that denotes the strength of herd be-
havior is proposed where each agent acts according to
the information obtained from his neighbors in network
and those in the minority are rewarded. Although the
model may be too simple and rough, it offers a starting
point aiming at those questions above. We have found
that the topology of information network affects the sys-
tem dynamic much and the system can self-organize to
a stable state with more profit comparing with random
choice game even only the local information is available.
II. MODEL
Boolean game is firstly proposed by Kauffman where
each agent has only one binary choice such as either buy-
ing or selling a stock[14]. The studies of Boolean game
have attracted not only the physicists’ but also the ecol-
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FIG. 1: The variance of the number of agent choosing +1
as a function of herd strength p. The four plots are the cases
of star, regular, random and scale-free networks, respectively.
The solid line represents the random choice game where σ2 =
0.25N . It is clear that the system profit is more than random
choice game when p ∈ (0, 0.7), p ∈ (0, 0.7) and p ∈ (0, 0.4)
in regular, random and scale-free networks, respectively. For
any p ∈ (0, 1), σ2 of the four cases satisfy that σ2regular <
σ2random < σ
2
scale-free < σ
2
star, that means the system profit S
satisfy that Sregular > Srandom > Sscale-free > Sstar.
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FIG. 2: (Color online)The number of agent choosing +1
vs time. The simulation takes place on regular networks of
size N = 1001. At the beginning, a large event with 701
agent choosing +1 happens. The red thick and black thin
curve show the variety of At after this large event for the
two extreme cases p = 0 and p = 1, respectively. Clearly, in
the case p = 0, At slowly reverts to the equilibrium position
A ≈ N
2
; while in the case p = 1, the system displays obvious
oscillation behavior. The inset exhibits the oscillation of At
in the case p = 1 for the first 30 time steps.
ogists’ and economists’ attention since it could explain
many empirical data and might contribute to the under-
standing of the underlying mechanisms of the many-body
ecosystems, although the dynamic rule is simple[1, 5, 15].
Inspired by the idea of minority game[16], which is a
simple but rich model describing a population of selfish
individuals fighting for a common resource, we propose
the present Boolean game where each agent chooses be-
tween two opposing actions, simplified as +1 and -1, and
the agents in the minority are rewarded. Each winner’s
score increases by one thus the system profit equals to
the number of winners[17, 18, 19]. In our model, at each
time step, each agent acts based on his neighbors at prob-
ability p, or acts all by himself at probability 1 − p. In
the former case, we assume each neighbor has the same
force. Since the arbitrary agent x would like to be in the
minority, he will choose +1 at the probability
sx
−1
sx
−1
+sx
+1
,
or choose -1 at the probability
sx+1
sx
−1
+sx
+1
, where sx−1 and
sx+1 denote the number of x’s neighbors choosing -1 and
+1 in the last time step, respectively. In the latter case,
since there is no information from others, the agent will
simply inherits his action in the last time step or chooses
the opposite action at a small probability m, named mu-
tation probability. It is worthwhile to emphasize that,
the agents do not know who are winners in previous steps
since the global information is not available, which is also
one of the main differences from the previous studies on
minority game.
The real-life ecosystem often seems a black box to us:
the outcome may be observed, but the underlying mech-
anism is not eyeable. If we see many agents display the
same action, we say the herd behavior occurs, although
those agents might prefer to be in the minority. In an-
other point of view, if each agent acts all by himself,
there is no preferential choice for +1 and -1 so as no herd
behavior will occur. Therefore, if the herd behavior oc-
curs, the agents’ actions must be at least partly based
on the information obtained from others. In this paper,
the strength of herd behavior is measured by how far the
agents’ actions are determined by others thus we set p
as the herd strength. This measurement is not quan-
titative since in some networks there exists an interval
belong which the positive p does not lead to herd behav-
ior comparing with the random choice game, however, it
is the measurement for the underlying possibility of the
occurrence of herd behavior.
III. SIMULATIONS
In this paper, all the simulation results are the aver-
age of 100 realizations and for each realizations the time
length is T = 104 unless a special statement is addressed.
The number of agents N = 1001 and mutation probabil-
ity m = 0.01 are fixed. Figure one shows the variance
σ2 = 1
T
∑T
t=1(At −
N
2 )
2 as a function of p in star, regu-
lar, random and scale-free networks, where At is the num-
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FIG. 3: The agent’s winning rate vs degree. Each point
denotes one agent and the solid line represents the average
winning rate over all the agents. In the cases of p = 0.0 and
p = 1.0, no correlation is detected. In the cases of p = 0.03
and p = 0.4, the positive correlation between agent’s profit
and degree is observed.
ber of agents who choose +1 at time step t. Clearly, the
smaller σ2 corresponds to the more system profit, and for
the completely random choice game, σ2 = 0.25N . The
regular network is a one-dimension lattice with periodic
boundary conditions and coordination number z = 3[20],
the random network is the ER network of connecting
probability 6 × 10−3[21, 22], and the scale-free network
is the BA network of m0 = m = 3[23]. Therefore, all
the networks except the star networks are of average de-
gree 〈k〉 = 6. Since the number of edges 〈k〉N2 is pro-
portional to the total quantity of information available
to agents, the networks used for simulating except star
networks have the same capacity of information. In star
network, it is not unexpected that the system profit will
be reduced when the herd strength increases. More in-
teresting, in each of the latter three cases, the system
preforms better than the random choice game when p is
in a certain interval, indicating the self-organized process
has taken place upon those networks.
Although having the same capacity of information, the
dynamic of scale-free networks is obviously distinguish-
able from that in regular and random networks, indicat-
ing that the topology affects the dynamic behavior much.
Note that, although the topology of regular and random
networks are obviously different for they have completely
different average distance and clustering coefficient and
so on[24], the dynamic behaviors are almost the same in
those two networks. The common ground is they have
almost the same degree variance 〈k2〉. According to the
inequality
〈k2〉star > 〈k
2〉scale-free > 〈k
2〉random > 〈k
2〉regular
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The agent’s winning rate as a function
of herd strength. The main plot is obtained by the simulation
upon a BA network of size N = 1001, in which the black, red,
green and blue curves from up to bottom represent the four
agents of degree 105, 46, 6 and 3 respectively. The inset shows
the case upon a BA network of size N = 2001, where the
black, red, green and blue curves from up to bottom represent
the four agents of degree 137, 77, 13 and 3 respectively. It is
observed that the agents having more information gain more
than those with less information.
and the simulation results, we suspect that the larger de-
gree variance, i.e. the greater information heterogeneity,
will lead to less system profit.
In figure one, one can see clearly that for all the four
cases, the variance σ2 is remarkably greater than the ran-
dom choice game at large p. Consider the extreme case
p = 1, if the agent choosing +1 and -1 are equably mixed
up in the networks, and the number of agent choosing
+1 at present time is At, then in the next time step, the
expectation of At+1 is 〈At+1〉 = N −At, with departure
|〈At+1〉 −
N
2 | = |At −
N
2 |. If at present time At is larger
than N2 , then At+1 will be smaller than
N
2 most prob-
ably, and the departure from N2 will not be reduced in
average. Therefore, in the case of p = 1, when the “large
event” happens, that is to say At is much larger or much
smaller than N2 at some time t, there will be a long du-
ration of oscillation after t, in which A skips between
up-side A > N2 and down-side A <
N
2 . The oscillation
behavior of A is shown in figure two. At the beginning, a
large event with A0 = 701 is given, then the large oscilla-
tion goes on about 30 time steps. In p = 1 case, if A gets
apart from N2 , the influence (large oscillation behavior)
will stand for long time, leading very large σ2. However,
in random choice game, whatever At−1, the expectation
of At is always 〈At〉 =
N
2 , and the distribution of At−
N
2
obeys Guassian form. That is the reason why the sys-
tems having poor performance at large p comparing with
the random choice game.
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FIG. 5: The agents’ winning rate 〈s〉 under different choice
patterns G0 of the five hub nodes. The simulation takes place
on the BA networks of size N = 1001, and the herd strength
is fixed as p = 0.1. The hollow and solid histograms represent
the winning rates of a hub node (k = 105) and a small node
(k = 3), respectively. One can see clearly, the winning rates of
the small node under different patterns are almost the same
as 〈s〉k=3 ≈ 0.49, which is obviously small than those of the
hub node especially in the case G0 = 0 and G0 = 5.
In another extreme case p = 0, the expectation of At+1
is 〈At+1〉 = At(1−m)+m(1−At) = At+m(1−2At). As-
sume At >
N
2 , for 0 < m <
1
2 , we have At > At+1 >
N
2 .
So in this case when m close to zero, no oscillation of A
will occur, but A slowly reverts to the equilibrium po-
sition A ≈ N2 after a large event. One can easily prove
that even for very small m, if the iteration time T is suf-
ficiently long, the system profit will be equal to random
choice game, that means σ2 = 0.25N . This is strongly
supported by the simulation results shown in figure one.
We also have check that the value of m will not affect
the characters of these dynamic systems unless m is very
large. The red thick curve in figure two is an example for
the case p = 0. At time t = 0, a large event A0 = 701
occurs, and then the curve At slowly reverts to
N
2 . Af-
ter about 170 time steps, it arrives at the equilibrium
position A ≈ N2 .
The two extreme cases also exhibit a clear picture why
the system profit can be maximized at a special value of
p. The herd mechanism (with probability p) will bring
oscillation, while the independent mechanism (with prob-
ability 1 − p) will lead to a long reversion process. The
former mechanism makes A skipping from one side to an-
other, while the latter one keeps A’s side. So, under a
proper value of p, the system can quickly arrive at the
equilibrium position A ≈ N2 after a large event occurs,
which leads to more system profit. The existence of op-
timal p has been demonstrated in figure one.
In succession, let’s focus on the scale-free case since it
may be closer to reality. Firstly, we assume the agent
choosing +1 and -1 are equably mixed up in the net-
work. Since there is also no degree-degree correlation for
BA networks[25], for arbitrary agent of degree k(here we
do not differentiate between node and the corresponding
agent), the probability at which he will choose +1 at time
step t+ 1 is
η1(k, t+ 1) = p(
k∑
i=0
i
k
Cikρ
i
1(t)(1 − ρ1(t))
k−i) + (1 − p)(1− ρ1(t)) = 1 + 2pρ1(t)− p− ρ1(t),
where ρ1(t) denotes the density of agents choosing +1
at time step t, and Cik =
k!
(k−i)!i! . Since the probability
η1(k, t + 1) is independent to k, there must be no corre-
lation between agent’s degree and profit. In figure three,
we report the agent’s winning rate vs degree, where the
winning rate is denoted by the average score 〈s〉 for in-
dividual during one time step. p = 0.0 and p = 1.0 cor-
respond to the completely independent and dependent
cases respectively, p = 0.03 is the point where the sys-
tem performs best, and p = 0.4 is another point where the
system profit is equal to the random choice game. One
can see clearly that there exist the positive correlation
between agent’s profit and degree in the cases p = 0.03
and p = 0.4, which means the agents of larger degree
will perform better than those of less degree. Figure four
shows the agent’s winning rate as a function of p for dif-
ferent k. It is clear that for a wide extent of p, the agents
having more information will gain more. Therefore, the
assumption is not true, thus there must be some kind of
correlation, which is another evidence of the existence of
self-organized process.
A natural question is addressed: why the agents of
large degree will gain more than those of less degree? The
reason is the choice of a few hub nodes (i. e. the nodes
of very large degree) can strongly influence many other
small nodes’ (i. e. the nodes of very small degree) choice
in the next time step, and those hub nodes can clean up
from this influence. Denote H the set of those hub nodes
and G0(t) the number of hun nodes choosing +1 at time
t. We assume at a certain time step t, G0(t) >
|H|
2 , that
means the number of hub nodes choosing +1 is more than
half. This departure will make some nodes connecting to
5those hub nodes, especially the small nodes, choose -1
in time t + 1 with a greater probability. Because the
majority of these small nodes’ hub neighbors choose +1
at present, this influence is remarkable and can not be
neglected since the small nodes have only a few neighbors.
The more departure |G0 −
|H|
2 | will lead to the greater
influence.
Figure five exhibits an example on BA networks of size
N = 1001, where H contains only five hub nodes of the
highest degree. In each time step, all the choice of these
five nodes form a choice configuration. There are in total
25 = 32 different configurations, which are classified into
6 patterns by identifying the number of agents choosing
+1. For example, G0 = 2 denotes the pattern that there
are 2 agents choosing +1 and other 3 choosing -1. Under
each choice pattern 0 ≤ G0 ≤ 5, since |G0 −
|H|
2 | =
|G0−2.5| is bigger than zero at all time, the hub node can
always gain more than the small node. And clearly, under
the choice pattern with larger departure, such as G0 = 0
and G0 = 5, the different of winning rates between the
hub node and the small node under these patterns is
much greater than the case of smaller departure.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, inspired by the minority game, we pro-
pose a model of Boolean game. the simulation results
upon various networks is shown, which indicate the dy-
namic of system is sensitive to the topology of network,
where the network of larger degree variance, i.e. the sys-
tem of greater information heterogeneity, leads to less
system profit. The system can perform better than the
random choice game. That is a bilievable evidence of the
existence of self-organized process taking place upon the
networks although only local information is available to
agents. We also have found that in heterogeneity net-
works, the agents with more information gain more than
those with less information for a wide extent of herd
strength p. In addition, it is clear that the trends of
varying of system profit and individual profit are differ-
ent as the increasing of herd strength, for example, in the
scale-free network with p = 0.5, the system profit is less
than random choice game but the profit of agent of large
degree is much more than that in random choice game.
Although this model is rough, it offers a simple and in-
tuitionistic paradigm of the many-body systems that can
self-organize even when only local information is avail-
able. Since the self-organized process is considered as
one of the key ingredients of the origins of complexity, it
might contribute to the understanding of the underlying
mechanism of the complex systems.
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